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We study the land and stock markets in Japan circa 1990 and in 2013. While the Nikkei stock average
in the late 1980s and its -48% crash in 1990 is generally recognized as a ﬁnancial market bubble, a
bigger bubble and crash was in the land market. The crash in the Nikkei which started on the ﬁrst
trading day of 1990 was predictable in April 1989 using the bond-stock earnings yield model which
signaled a crash but not when. We show that it was possible to use the changepoint detection model
based solely on price movements for proﬁtable exits of long positions both circa 1990 and in 2013.
Keywords: bubble; change point detection; bond-stock model; Nikkei stock average; golf course
membership index
JEL Classiﬁcation: G01, C11
1. Introduction
The crash of the Japanese stock market in the 1990s and the land markets beginning in 1991
ushered in two decades of deﬂation, weak economic markets and a lost generation of young
people. Various Japanese policies and regulatory constraints exacerbated the poor economic
situation and never resolved the basic problem of over leveraging and excessive debt that was a
major part of the 1980s buildup.
Our purpose here is not to discuss these issues including the policy not to let the bankrupt
companies and individuals go into bankruptcy and start over so that the successful ones would
continue and the failures would exit the market or restructure. Rather, our concern is with two
issues. First, was it possible to predict the crash and secondly could investors have exited the
market unscathed with most of their gains or actually shorted the market successfully using a
model based solely on prices? We assume that there was a bubble in both the stock market
measured by the Nikkei225 and the land market proxied by the golf course membership indices
in various parts of Japan but we do not need there to be an oﬃcial bubble for our results to
hold.
Tests of whether a market is a bubble or not have been studied by Stiglitz (1990) and the
papers in that issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives and by Camerer (1989), Scheinkman
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Professor Merton H. Miller who encouraged Ziemba to further study of the golf
course membership index markets.
∗Corresponding author. Email: wtzimi@mac.com
1
June 5, 2014 Quantitative Finance japan˙bubble
and Xing (2003), Jarrow et al. (2011), Evanoﬀ et al. (2012), Anderson et al. (2013), Phillips et al.
(2013) among others.
Section 2 investigates the question whether or not the Japanese stock market crash was indeed
predictable. French and Poterba (1991) and Ziemba and Schwartz (1991) use similar growth
models to ﬁrst justify the high prices of Japanese stocks at that time and the same models to
indicated that with diﬀerent weaker growth parameters a lot lower equilibrium stock market
price was predicted. Ziemba and Schwartz (1991) further showed that a long bond minus the
reciprocal of past earnings to price ratio model did predict the 1990 crash with a danger signal in
April 1989. That model derived from the 1987 US stock market crash predicted correctly 12/12
10%+ declines of the twenty such declines from 1948 to 1988. The other eight declines were for
other reasons than high price earnings ratios compared to high long bond interest rates.
This paper discusses the BSEYD (bond stock earnings yield diﬀerential) model applied to
Japan. A survey of the application of the BSEYD model to the US and other markets since it
was discovered in 1988 is in Lleo and Ziemba (2014). The prediction of stock market crises and
crashes has been studied by many authors. Major contributions with diﬀerent models have been
made by Buﬀett (2001), Corcos et al. (2002), Kindleberger and Aliber (2011), Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ (2009), Shiller (2000, 2009), Sornette (2003, 2009), Sornette and Zhou (2002), Weigand
and Irons (2007), Yan et al. (2012b) and Yan et al. (2012a)
Section 3 describes the changepoint model that we use to determine exits and short entries
in bubble type markets. Section 4 applies the model to the Japanese stock market proxied by
the Nikkei225 stock average which is price weighted similar to the 30 stock Dow Jones average.
Section 5 applies the model to the golf course membership markets in various regions of Japan.
Section 6 considers the overall land markets in Japan from 1955 to 1990 before the crash with
some discussion regarding this market since 1990. Section 7 considers the 2013 Nikkei market.
Section 8 discusses the use of the model for short selling. Section 9 concludes.
2. Was the 1990 Japanese stock market crash predictable?
Starting on the ﬁrst trading day of 1990, the Nikkei stock average (Nikkei) declined. When it
bottomed, the market had fallen 48% from 38,916 at the end of December 1989 to 20,222 on
October 1, 1990. This section presents the bond stock earnings yield model that suggested a
danger signal in April 1987. This is based on too high interest rates relative to earnings yield,
namely the trailing reciprocal of the price-earnings ratio.
In May 1988 I (Ziemba) was invited by Yamaichi Securities to interview to be the ﬁrst Ya-
maichi visiting professor of ﬁnance at the University of Tsukuba, a Japanese national university.
Yamaichi wished to try to establish the study of ﬁnance, especially investments, in Japanese uni-
versities, which was not generally taught. They established a ﬁve-year program with ﬁve such
visiting professors in succession. My teaching at the university (investments, security market
anomalies, futures and options) was supplemented with a two-day a week consulting position in
Tokyo some 60 kilometers southwest of Tsukuba at the Yamaichi Research Institute of Yamaichi
Securities, then the fourth largest securities ﬁrm in Japan and the sixth largest in the world. In
my interview I asked if I could study market imperfections (anomalies) and stock market crashes
in two study groups with some of the young Yamaichi Research Institute employees who also
came up to Tsukuba for my classes.
My proposal was accepted and each study group with about ten eager young students in each
group proceeded by me giving lectures on the US experience and they helping me investigate the
Japanese situation. We focused on the postwar period 1948 to 1988 and much of what I learned
appears in the book Invest Japan, Ziemba and Schwartz (1991) and the 1989-1993 research
papers of Ziemba, including Schwartz and Ziemba (2000) and Stone and Ziemba (1993). My
wife Sandra L. Schwartz and I also wrote the book Power Japan (1992) that discussed the
Japanese economy. Sandra had a pretty good idea right away that the Japanese policies that let
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to astronomically high land and stock prices and massive trade surpluses would lead to disaster
and they would eventually lose most of the money that they received from selling cars, stereos
and the like. We made a list of prestige buildings that the Japanese overpaid for in the 1987-89
era in Power Japan. Even at the height of their economic power in 1989 only 3% of Japanese
assets were invested abroad.
My study groups started in August 1988 and ended a year later. I was asked to remain as
a consultant for the fall of 1988 to complete a factor model discussed in Ziemba and Schwartz
(1991) and Schwartz and Ziemba (2000) which was originally presented at a Berkeley Program
in Finance meeting in Santa Barbara in September 1992. The factor model used anomaly ideas
such as mean reversion, momentum and value embedded in 30 variables to separate and rank
stocks by their future mean performance from best to worst for all the 1000+ stocks on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange ﬁrst section which was about 86% of the total capitalization of the Japanese
stock market. The model performed well out of sample so was useful for hedge fund long-short
trading as well as long only investing. The hedge fund Buchanan Partners in London discovered
the model which was discussed in Invest Japan when they bought a copy of the book and hired
me to consult with them in their warrant trading which was largely long underpriced warrants
and short overpriced stocks. Their trading was successful and the model, which was estimated
using data during a stock market rise still worked when the decline came since variables such as
earnings were the key drivers of the returns. An update of Japanese anomalies to 1994 appears
in Comolli and Ziemba (2000). Ziemba’s Japanese, US and other anomaly papers are reprinted
in Ziemba (2012).
In the crash study group I came up with a simple model in 1988 with only a single variable
that being the diﬀerence between stock and bond rates of return. The idea was that stocks and
bonds compete for investment dollars and, when interest rates are low, stocks are favored and
when interest rates are high, bonds are favored. The main thing that I wished to focus on is that
when the measure, the diﬀerence between these two rates, the long bond yield minus the earnings
yield (the reciprocal of the price earnings ratio), was very large, then there was a high chance
of a stock market crash, namely a 10%+ fall in the index within one year. The model explains
the October 1987 crash. That application is how this idea came to me. Table 1 and Figure 1
show this. The boxes indicate that there is extreme danger in the stock market because 30-year
government bond yields are very much higher than usual stock market yields measured by the
reciprocal of the last year’s reported price earnings ratio. These high interest rates invariably
lead to a stock market crash. Here the danger indicator moved across a statistical 95% conﬁdence
line in April 1987.1 The market ignored this signal but did eventually crash in October 1987.
While Table 1 uses S&P500 data and Berge et al. (2008) use the US MSCI, both reach the same
conclusion. There was a similar signal ignored by most investors in the US S&P500 in 1999 and
then a crash that began in August 2000 and a weak stock market in 2001/02 which is discussed
in Ziemba (2003).2
In 1988-89, I asked one of my young colleagues in my crash study group, Sugheri Iishi, to
check this for Japan. There were twenty 10% plus crashes during the forty years, 1948-88, see
Table 2. We found that whenever this measure was in the danger zone (that is outside a 95%
conﬁdence band), there was a crash of 10% or more from the current level within one year. Not
all crashes had the measure in the danger zone but whenever it was there was a crash with no
misses. That model was 12/12.
So the measure was successful at predicting future crashes – but when and how deep there
was no precise way to know. However, long-run mean reversion (Poterba and Summers (1985))
1For a study of this measure for staying in or exiting stock markets from 1975 and 1980 to 2005 in ﬁve major countries (US,
Japan, UK, Germany and Canada), see Berge et al. (2008). In each country ﬁnal wealth under the strategy in cash in the
danger periods (about 20% of the time) is about double the buy and hold strategy with lower standard deviation risk.
2Later Yardeni (1997) reported on a related Fed model which is a special case to the diﬀerence model used here. See Lleo
and Ziemba (2013) where critiques of the diﬀerence model are also presented and discussed. Our aim here is the answer the
question: does the model actually predict stock market crashes?
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Table 1. S&P500 index, PE ratios, government bond yields and the yield premium over stocks, January 1984 to
August 1988. Source: Ziemba and Schwartz (1991)
S&P (a) (b)
Index PER 30 Yr G bd 1/pe,% (a)-(b)
1986 Jan 208.19 14.63 9.32 6.84 2.48
Feb 219.37 15.67 8.28 6.38 1.90
Mar 232.33 16.50 7.59 6.06 1.53
Apr 237.98 16.27 7.58 6.15 1.43
May 238.46 17.03 7.76 5.87 1.89
Jun 245.30 17.32 7.27 5.77 1.50
Jul 240.18 16.31 7.42 6.13 1.29
Aug 245.00 17.47 7.26 5.72 1.54
Sep 238.27 15.98 7.64 6.26 1.38
Oct 237.36 16.85 7.61 5.93 1.68
Nov 245.09 16.99 7.40 5.89 1.51
Dec 248.60 16.72 7.33 5.98 1.35
1987 Jan 264.51 15.42 7.47 6.49 0.98
Feb 280.93 15.98 7.46 6.26 1.20
Mar 292.47 16.41 7.65 6.09 1.56
Apr 289.32 16.22 9.56 6.17 3.39
May 289.12 16.32 8.63 6.13 2.50
Jun 301.38 17.10 8.40 5.85 2.55
Jul 310.09 17.92 8.89 5.58 3.31
Aug 329.36 18.55 9.17 5.39 3.78
Sep 318.66 18.10 9.66 5.52 4.14
Oct 280.16 14.16 9.03 7.06 1.97
Nov 245.01 13.78 8.90 7.26 1.64
Dec 240.96 13.55 9.10 7.38 1.72
1988 Jan 250.48 12.81 8.40 7.81 0.59
Feb 258.10 13.02 8.33 7.68 0.65
Mar 265.74 13.42 8.74 7.45 1.29
Apr 262.61 13.24 9.10 7.55 1.55
May 256.20 12.92 9.24 7.74 1.50
Jun 270.68 13.65 8.85 7.33 1.52
Jul 269.44 13.59 9.18 7.36 1.82
Aug 263.73 13.30 9.30 7.52 1.78
suggests that the longer the bull run is and the more over-priced the measure is, the longer and
deeper the decline will probably be. Then one can use the measure as part of an econometric
system to estimate future scenarios. The rest of this paper presents a model to exit or enter such
markets.
Each time the spread exceeded the 4.23 cutoﬀ (which was higher than 95% conﬁdence) there
was a crash. The measure was way in the danger zone in late 1989 and the decline (the 21st
crash) began on the ﬁrst trading day of 1990 with the Nikkei stock average peaking at 38,916.
See Figure 2. It is too bad Yamaichi’s top management did not listen to Iishi when I sent him
up to explain our results in Japanese; there was much greater danger in the market than they
thought in 1989. By 1999 Yamaichi Securities was bankrupt and ceased to exist. Figure 3(a)
shows why this happened because too high interest rates in 1990 that completely crushed the
economy.
The model also indicated that the valuation was still high as of May 29, 1990 at 4.88. Not
much later, the 22nd crash began. Interestingly, at the bottom of the 22nd crash on October
1, 1990, the Nikkei was at 20,222, which was almost exactly the mean. Meanwhile, the same
calculation on May 29, 1990, for the S&P500 is shown in Figure 1. Indeed, it was cheap, that is
below the mean, since the September 1987 peak of 4.42. The May 29, 1990 value of 1.11 was,
however, slightly above the mean level and the highest since the late fall of 1987.
Japan has had weak stock and land markets for twenty-three years, since the beginning of 1990.
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Figure 1. Bond and stock yield diﬀerential model for the S&P500, 1980-1990, Source: Ziemba and Schwartz, 1991
Value of S&P500 for various spread values
Date/level Spread, % S&P500
May 29, 1990 1.11 360.65
Mean 0.98 355.00
Upper limit 2.09 415.00
Lower limit -0.13 309.00
Table 2. The Twenty Corrections of 10% or more on the NSA from 1949 to 1988. Source: Yamaichi Research
Institute
Index Value Date
Peak Valley % decrease Peak Valley # Months
1 176.89 85.25 -51.8 01-Sep-49 06-Jul-50 11
2 474.43 295.18 -37.8 4-Feb-53 1-Apr-53 2
3 366.69 321.79 -12.2 6-May-53 3-Jun-53 1
4 595.46 471.53 -20.8 4-May-57 27-Dec-57 8
5 1,829.74 1,258.00 -31.2 18-Jul-61 19-Dec-61 5
6 1,589.76 1,216.04 -23.5 14-Feb-62 29-Oct-62 9
7 1,634.37 1201.26 -26.5 5-Apr-63 18-Dec-63 9
8 1,369.00 1,020.49 -25.5 3-Jul-64 12-Jul-65 13
9 1,588.73 1,364.34 -14.1 1-Apr-66 15-Dec-66 8
10 1,506.27 1,250.40 -17.0 1-Mar-67 11-Dec-67 9
11 2,534.45 1,929.64 -23.9 6-Apr-70 27-May-70 2
12 2,740.98 2,227.25 -18.7 13-Aug-71 20-Oct-71 3
13 5,359.74 3,355.13 -37.4 24-Jan-73 9-Oct-74 21
14 4,564.52 3,814.02 -16.4 12-May-75 29-Sep-75 5
15 5,287.65 4,597.26 -13.1 5-Sep-77 24-Nov-77 3
16 8,019.14 6,849.78 -14.6 17-Aug-81 1-Oct-82 14
17 11,190.17 9,703.35 -13.3 4-May-84 23-Jul-84 3
18 18,936.24 15,819.58 -16.5 20-Aug-86 22-Oct-86 2
19 25,929.42 22,702.74 -12.4 17-Jun-87 22-Jul-87 1
20 26,646.43 21,036.76 -21.1 14-Oct-87 11-Nov-87 1
Average -0.224 6.5
.
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Figure 2. Bond and stock yield diﬀerential model for Nikkei, 1980-1990, Source: Ziemba and Schwartz, 1991
Value of Nikkei for various spread values
Date/level Spread, % Nikkei
May 29, 1990 4.88 32,818
Mean 3.79 20,022
Upper limit 4.23 23,754
Lower limit 3.35 17,303
There are many factors for this that are political as well as economic. But the rising interest
rates for eight full months until August 1990 shown in Figure 3 is one of them. This extreme
tightening of an over-levered economy was too much. Cheap and easily available money, which
caused the big run-up in asset prices in the 1980s turned into expensive and unavailable money
in the 1990s.
3. The changepoint detection model for exit bubble type markets
The ﬁnance and economics literature has research on identifying and timing bubbles. Trading
bubble type markets is diﬃcult. It is known that famed bubble trader George Soros shorted the
Japanese market too soon in 1988 and lost about $1 billion. As shown in section 2, Ziemba’s
BSEYD model suggested an exit danger signal in April 1989 with the decline in 1990 of some
-48% starting on the ﬁrst trading day of 1990.
There are however some studies such as those referenced in Section 1 which mostly focus on
determining if a particular market is a bubble or not. What we mean by a bubble is a price that
is going up just because it is going up! That is one where the price exceeds the fair value.
In this paper we present a Bayesian changepoint detection model that seems to work well
timing when to exit a long position. We apply the model to Japanese stock and land markets
– the latter proxied by the golf course membership market which has weekly transaction data.
The Nikkei225 data is daily. We do not attempt to use the model for various types of land since
there is no frequent data available.
The basic idea is that there is a fast rate of growth in prices, then a peak and then a fast
decline. The model tries to exit near the peak in prices. It is based on the mathematical theory
of changepoint detection (or disorder detection) for stochastic processes. A changepoint of a
6
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Figure 3. Interest rates in Japan
stochastic process is an unknown moment of time when its probabilistic structure changes (e.g.
the mean value changes from a positive number to a negative one). The theory studies statistics
that allow to detect such changes after they happen.
Changepoint detection methods have been successfully applied in production quality control,
radiolocation, information security, and have shown their usefulness. Their history goes back to
the pioneering work of Shewhart (1925), and the ﬁrst fundamental results by Page, Roberts,
Shiryaev and others of 1950-60s. Surveys of the history and the recent developments in this ﬁeld
can be found in e. g. the introduction to the book by Poor and Hadjiljadis (2009).
In the ﬁnancial context, a changepoint may represent a moment when the market starts to
decline. It can be identiﬁed with a moment of time when the trend of the sequence of the market’s
index value becomes negative. The objective of the model is to detect this change after it occurs
and to close a long position maximizing the gain measured by a given utility function.
We emphasize that the changepoint model does not predict a decline of price, but considers
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the problem of how to detect it after it has started, taking into account that temporal declines
may be caused by the volatility of the price rather than a real change of the trend. In particular,
such a decline need not necessarily be caused by a crash of a bubble, but can be due to e.g. a
structural change in an economy or bad news for a company. Thus we do not need the price
process to be a bubble in terms of one deﬁnition or another.
3.1 The description of the model
The model describes the evolution of the value S of an index at moments of time t = 0, 1, . . . , T
driven by a geometric Gaussian random walk with logarithmic mean and variance (μ1, σ21) up
to an unknown moment of time θ and (μ2, σ22) after θ. The moment θ will be interpreted as the
point when the trend of the index changes from an increasing to a decreasing, and is called a
changepoint. In this paper, we provide only a brief exposition, details can be found in Zhitlukhin
(2013); a continuous-time analogue was considered by Shiryaev and Zhitlukhin (2012).
Let ξ = (ξt)Tt=0 be a sequence of i.i.d.
1 standard normal random variables deﬁned on a proba-
bility space (Ω,F ,P). The sequence S = (St)Tt=0 is deﬁned by its logarithmic increments via
S0 = 1, log
St
St−1
=
{
μ1 + σ1ξt, t < θ,
μ2 + σ2ξt, t ≥ θ,
where μ1, μ2 ∈ R, σ1, σ2 > 0 are known parameters. The choice of S0 = 1 means that all the
prices are expressed relatively to the price at time t = 0, which does not reduce the generality
of the model.
It is assumed that θ is a random variable deﬁned on (Ω,F ,P), independent of the sequence ξt
and taking values in the set {1, 2, . . . , T + 1} with known prior probabilities pt = P(θ = t). The
value p1 is the probability that the changepoint appears from the beginning of the sequence St ,
and pT+1 is the probability that the changepoint does not appear within the time horizon [0, T ].
The prior distribution function of θ is denoted by G(t) = p1 + p2 + . . . + pt.
Let Uα : R+ → R, α ≤ 0, be the family of negative power and logarithmic utility functions:2
Uα(x) = −xα for α < 0, U0(x) = log x.
The problem consists in ﬁnding the moment of time τ which maximizes the utility from closing
a long position provided one opens it at time t = 0 and needs to close before t = T .
Let F = (Ft)Tt=0, Ft = σ(Su; u ≤ t) be the ﬁltration generated by the process S. By deﬁnition,
a moment τ when one closes the position should be a stopping time of the ﬁltration F, i. e. τ
should be a random variable taking values in the set {0, 1, . . . , T} such that {ω : τ(ω) ≤ t} ∈ Ft
for any t = 0, . . . , T . The class of all stopping times τ ≤ T of F is denoted by M. The notion
of a stopping time reﬂects the concept that a decision to close the position at time t should be
based only on the information obtained from the observed values S0, S1, . . . , St and should not
rely on the future values St+1, St+2, which are unknown at time t.
The problems of optimal closing of a long positions with respect to the utility function Uα is
formulated as the optimal stopping problem
Vα = sup
τ∈M
EUα(Sτ ). (1)
1Independent and identically distributed.
2These functions are from capital growth theory and are known to maximize long run asymptotic growth of wealth; see
e.g., Kelly (1956), Breiman (1961), and MacLean et al. (2010). Log is full Kelly and negative power are fractional Kelly
strategies blending cash with the max Elog portfolio to lower risk and the long run growth rate.
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Its solution consists in ﬁnding the optimal stopping time τα, at which the supremum is attained
(it is shown that such a stopping time exists).
It is assumed that μ1 > −ασ21/2 and μ2 < −ασ22/2. Under these assumptions the sequence
{Uα(St)}t increases on average if the logarithmic increments of S are i.i.d. N (μ1, σ21) random
variables, and decreases on average if they are i.i.d. N (μ2, σ22) random variables. Consequently,
the random variable θ represents the moment of time when holding the index value starts to
decrease.
In order to formulate our main result, Theorem 1, we introduce auxiliary notation. Let ψ =
(ψt)Tt=0 denote the Shiryaev–Roberts statistic of the sequence of values St:
ψ0 = 0, ψt =
σ1
σ2
(pt + ψt−1) e
(Xt−μ1)2
2σ22
− (Xt−μ2)2
2σ22 , t = 1, . . . , T.
where X = (Xt)Tt=1 denote the logarithmic increments of the index values, Xt = log(St/St−1).
Deﬁne recurrently the family of functions Vα(t, x) for α ≤ 0, t = T, T − 1, . . . , 0, x ≥ 0 as
follows. For α = 0 let
V0(T, x) ≡ 0, V0(t, x) = max
{
0, μ2(x + pt+1) + μ1(1−G(t + 1)) + f0(t, x)
}
,
where the function f0(t, x) is given by
f0(t, x) =
1
σ1
√
2π
∫
R
V0
(
t + 1,
σ1
σ2
(
pt+1 + x) e
(z−μ1)2
2σ21
− (z−μ2)2
2σ22
)
e
− (z−μ1)2
2σ21 dz.
For α < 0 deﬁne
Vα(T, x) ≡ 0, Vα(t, x) = max
{
0, βt
[
(γ − 1)(x + pt+1) + (β − 1)(1−G(t + 1))
]
+ fα(t, x)
}
,
where β = eαμ1+α
2σ21/2, γ = eαμ2+α
2σ22/2 and
fα(t, x) =
1
σ1
√
2π
∫
R
Vα
(
t + 1, (pt+1 + x) · σ1
σ2
e
(z−μ1)2
2σ21
− (z−μ2)2
2σ22
)
e
− (z−μ1−ασ21)2
2σ21 dz.
Theorem 3.1 (Zhitlukhin (2013), Chapter 3): The following stopping time is optimal in
problem (1):
τ∗α = inf{0 ≤ t ≤ T : ψt ≥ b∗α(t)}, (2)
where the stopping boundary b∗α(t), t = 0, . . . , T , is
b∗α(t) = inf{x ≥ 0 : Vα(t, x) = 0}.
Theorem 3.1 states that the optimal stopping time is the ﬁrst moment of time when the
Shiryaev–Roberts statistic exceeds the time-dependent threshold b∗α(t). To ﬁnd the function
b∗α(t) numerically, one ﬁrst computes recurrently the functions Vα(t, x) for t = T, T − 1, . . . , 0
and then ﬁnds their minimal roots x ≥ 0. The algorithm is described in Zhitlukhin (2013) along
with the estimation of its computational error.
It is also possible to express the optimal stopping time through the posterior probability process
π = (πt)Tt=0 deﬁned as the conditional probability πt = P(θ ≤ t | Ft). From Bayes formula (see
details in Zhitlukhin (2013)),
ψt =
πt
1− πt (1−G(t)), πt =
ψt
ψt + 1−G(t) .
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Consequently, the optimal stopping time in problem (1) can be represented in the form
τ∗α = inf{0 ≤ t ≤ T : πt ≥ b˜∗α(t)}, where b˜∗α(t) =
b∗α(t)
b∗α(t) + 1−G(t)
.
This representation provides a clear interpretation of the optimal stopping time: one should
close a long position as soon as one becomes suﬃciently conﬁdent that the disorder has already
happened, which quantitatively means the posterior probability πt exceeds the threshold b˜∗α(t).
3.2 Application of the model to market data
We observe an index such that initially its value has a positive trend. The time interval between
two consecutive index values can be arbitrary. It is assumed that a long position is opened at
time t = 0 and should be closed by a ﬁxed time t = T . The aim is to ﬁnd the right moment
when to close the position.
The observable values of the index are represented by the sequence S0, S1, . . . , ST , which is
assumed to follow the above model of a geometric Gaussian random walk with a changepoint.
In the applications below, we assume θ is uniformly distributed in the set {1, 2, . . . , T}, which
in some sense corresponds to the “worst case” (since the uniform distribution has the maximum
entropy among all distributions on a ﬁnite set).
The parameters μ1, σ1 of the model are estimated using from the past data S0, S−1, S−2, . . . ,
S−t0 , where t0 is some ﬁxed constant, assuming that the logarithmic increments of the sequence
{St}0t=−t0 are i.i.d N (μ1, σ1) random variables.
The choice of the values μ2 and σ2 is subjective, as we do not know the “future” values of
the drift and volatility after they change. In the applications below, we let σ2 = σ1 and consider
several choices of the drift parameter1: μ2 = −0.5μ1, μ2 = −μ1, μ2 = −2μ1, μ2 = −3μ1, and
μ2 = −5μ1, which however do not give any signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results.
We also vary the utility function Uα and the ﬁnal moment of time T , and apply the model to
U0(x) = log x, U−1/2(x) = −1/
√
x and U−1(x) = −1/x (i. e. the full Kelly rule, the 2/3 Kelly
rule and the half Kelly rule assuming log normally distributed asset) and T corresponding to the
end of 1992, 1990 and 1989 for the 1990 crash and T corresponding to the end of 2013 for the
recent Nikkei225 data. When T corresponds to the end of 1989 no crash occurs on the observable
time horizon, so the model should close the position close to the global maximum.
4. The Japanese stock market bubble
4.1 Background
The Japanese stock market was closed after World War II ended in 1945 until its reopening in
1948. From 1948 to 1988 there was a huge rise in the stock market measured by the Nikkei225
price weighted stock index as well as the Topix value weighted index of more than 1000 stocks.
A steady increase in quality and quantity of equipment and automobiles of various kinds led to
an enormous inﬂow of ﬁnancial assets. These in turn were invested primarily in Japanese stocks
and land. The land and stock markets were greatly intertwined as discussed by Ziemba (1991)
and Stone and Ziemba (1993); see also section 6. To get an idea of the price pressure on Japanese
land prices, consider that in the late 1980s:
• some 120 million people lived in Japan in an area the size of Montana,
1It is well known that getting the means right is much more important than the variances, see Chopra and Ziemba (1993).
Thus we focus on the analysis of the performance of the model for various drift values, but we assume that the variance
stays constant.
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• only 5% of the land was used to house the people, buildings and factories because most of
the land is mountainous,
• most of the land was owned by large corporations but 60% of Japanese families and 55%
of those in Tokyo owned their own home,
• there was massive savings by households,
• only some 3% of Japanese assets were invested abroad despite great fear in the west and
some very public purchases at inﬂated prices of expensive property such as the Pebble
Beach golf course,
• low interest rates in the mid to late 1980s fueled the stock and land booms,
• the Nikkei225 rose 220 times in yen and 550 times in US dollars from 1948 to 1988 yet
there were twenty 10%+ declines in the Nikkei225, see Table 2.
Figure 4 shows the Nikkei stock average from 1984 to 2014 and Figure 3(b) shows the Bank
of Japan target interest rate from 1980 to 1998.
Figure 4. Nikkei-225 from 1984 to 2013
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
10
K
20
K
30
K
40
K
The Nikkei peaked at the end of December 1989 at 39,816. In section 2, the bond-stock earnings
yield model was shown to go into the danger zone in April 1989. That model suggested that a
large decline or crash was coming but not when. To apply the changepoint detection model a
maximum ﬁnal time horizon needs to be speciﬁed. We apply it for three time horizons, namely
to the ends of 1989, 1990 and 1992. In section 6 we apply the model to the Nikkei225 in 2013 .
4.2 Nikkei stock average in the 1980-90s
The model was applied to the Nikkei stock average with six diﬀerent starting dates (January 1987,
July 1987, July 1988, January 1989, July 1989, October 1989), four diﬀerent values of the ratio
μ2/μ1 (−0.5, −1.0, −2.0, −5.0), three diﬀerent utility functions U0(x) = log x, U−1/2(x) = 1/
√
x,
U−1(x) = −1/x, and three diﬀerent time horizons (the ends of 1989, 1990, and 1992). In all the
cases, σ2 = σ1.
The prices are daily closing prices; the parameters μ1 and σ1 are estimated using the 100
previous index values before the entering date. The data appears in Tables 3-5 and Figure 5.
The tables show the exit dates obtained by applying the model for the corresponding values
of the parameters, and the ratio of the price at these dates to the maximal closing price (on
December 29, 1989). The ﬁgures present the four entry dates in 1988-1989 marked by blue circles
and the corresponding exit dates marked by red squares for the value of the parameters α = 0,
μ2 = −μ1. The graphs are normalized in a such way that the price on the ﬁrst trading day of
1984 is 100.
The results show for α = 0 (log utility) exits from 54.5% of the maximum for entries in 1987
to 94.7% for entries in 1988 and 85.6% for entries in 1989 of the global maximum of the market.
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When T=1989, the exit percent of peak value depends mostly on the entry time. Later entries
exit closer to the peak. The T=1992 results vary greatly depending on the entry date with the
early entry dates exiting well below the peak and later entry dates exiting closer to the global
maximum. The choice of α and the value of the ratio μ1/μ2 does not change the results as we
are just searching for the exit point, not trading after that, see Tables 3 to 5. In general the
change point model yields a proﬁt based on the entry and exit points; see Figure 5(a) and 5(b).
But it is possible that late entries close to the peak as in Figure 5(c) with T=1992 result in a
trading loss because of the sharp decline after the peak.
Table 3.: The exit dates for Nikkei stock average, T = end of 1990
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.12.86 0.00086 0.01300 26.02.90 (85.6%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.87 0.00191 0.01114 23.02.90 (89.7%) 11.11.87 (54.1%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.88 0.00163 0.00585 16.01.90 (94.7%) 16.01.90 (94.7%) 16.01.90 (94.7%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
28.12.88 0.00064 0.00634 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 18.01.90 (94.4%)
30.06.89 0.00039 0.00602 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
29.09.89 0.00045 0.00497 26.02.90 (85.6%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
α = −0.5
26.12.86 0.00086 0.01300 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.87 0.00191 0.01114 26.02.90 (85.6%) 10.11.87 (55.7%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.88 0.00163 0.00585 16.01.90 (94.7%) 16.01.90 (94.7%) 16.01.90 (94.7%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
28.12.88 0.00064 0.00634 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
30.06.89 0.00039 0.00602 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
29.09.89 0.00045 0.00497 26.02.90 (85.6%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
α = −1.0
26.12.86 0.00086 0.01300 23.02.90 (89.7%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 11.11.87 (54.1%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.87 0.00191 0.01114 04.01.88 (54.5%) 10.11.87 (55.7%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.88 0.00163 0.00585 18.01.90 (94.4%) 18.01.90 (94.4%) 16.01.90 (94.7%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
28.12.88 0.00064 0.00634 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
30.06.89 0.00039 0.00602 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
29.09.89 0.00045 0.00497 26.02.90 (85.6%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
Table 4.: The exit dates for Nikkei stock average, T = end of 1989
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.12.86 0.00086 0.01300 23.08.89 (89.7%) 17.07.89 (86.0%) 11.11.87 (54.1%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.87 0.00191 0.01114 11.11.87 (54.1%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.88 0.00163 0.00585 29.06.89 (84.7%) 16.10.89 (88.6%) 16.10.89 (88.6%) 16.10.89 (88.6%)
28.12.88 0.00064 0.00634 16.10.89 (88.6%) 07.09.89 (87.8%) 07.09.89 (87.8%) 12.10.89 (89.4%)
30.06.89 0.00039 0.00602 07.11.89 (90.6%) 12.10.89 (89.4%) 06.09.89 (88.1%) 30.08.89 (88.6%)
29.09.89 0.00045 0.00497 19.12.89 (98.8%) 11.12.89 (97.0%) 16.10.89 (88.6%) 12.10.89 (89.4%)
α = −0.5
26.12.86 0.00086 0.01300 17.07.89 (86.0%) 29.06.89 (84.7%) 10.11.87 (55.7%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.87 0.00191 0.01114 11.11.87 (54.1%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.88 0.00163 0.00585 06.09.89 (88.1%) 16.10.89 (88.6%) 16.10.89 (88.6%) 16.10.89 (88.6%)
28.12.88 0.00064 0.00634 12.10.89 (89.4%) 07.09.89 (87.8%) 06.09.89 (88.1%) 08.09.89 (87.7%)
30.06.89 0.00039 0.00602 07.11.89 (90.6%) 12.10.89 (89.4%) 06.09.89 (88.1%) 30.08.89 (88.6%)
29.09.89 0.00045 0.00497 19.12.89 (98.8%) 11.12.89 (97.0%) 16.10.89 (88.6%) 12.10.89 (89.4%)
α = −1.0
26.12.86 0.00086 0.01300 28.06.89 (85.4%) 15.06.89 (84.6%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.87 0.00191 0.01114 11.11.87 (54.1%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.88 0.00163 0.00585 07.09.89 (87.8%) 16.10.89 (88.6%) 16.10.89 (88.6%) 16.10.89 (88.6%)
28.12.88 0.00064 0.00634 12.10.89 (89.4%) 07.09.89 (87.8%) 06.09.89 (88.1%) 07.09.89 (87.8%)
30.06.89 0.00039 0.00602 06.11.89 (91.1%) 12.10.89 (89.4%) 06.09.89 (88.1%) 30.08.89 (88.6%)
29.09.89 0.00045 0.00497 15.12.89 (98.3%) 11.12.89 (97.0%) 16.10.89 (88.6%) 12.10.89 (89.4%)
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Figure 5. The results for the Nikkei index, base January 4, 1984: the enter (blue circles) and exit (red squares)
dates for the values of the parameters α = 0.0, μ2 = −μ1.
Table 5.: The exit dates for Nikkei stock average, T = end of 1992
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.12.86 0.00086 0.01300 06.08.90 (73.5%) 02.04.90 (72.0%) 22.03.90 (76.7%) 19.03.90 (80.3%)
30.06.87 0.00191 0.01114 26.02.90 (85.6%) 11.11.87 (54.1%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.88 0.00163 0.00585 21.02.90 (91.8%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 18.01.90 (94.4%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
28.12.88 0.00064 0.00634 19.03.90 (80.3%) 13.03.90 (83.8%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%)
30.06.89 0.00039 0.00602 22.03.90 (76.7%) 14.03.90 (83.1%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%)
29.09.89 0.00045 0.00497 14.03.90 (83.1%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 23.02.90 (89.7%)
α = −0.5
26.12.86 0.00086 0.01300 02.04.90 (72.0%) 02.04.90 (72.0%) 20.03.90 (79.2%) 11.11.87 (54.1%)
30.06.87 0.00191 0.01114 04.01.88 (54.5%) 10.11.87 (55.7%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.88 0.00163 0.00585 21.02.90 (91.8%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
28.12.88 0.00064 0.00634 19.03.90 (80.3%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%)
30.06.89 0.00039 0.00602 22.03.90 (76.7%) 14.03.90 (83.1%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%)
29.09.89 0.00045 0.00497 14.03.90 (83.1%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 21.02.90 (91.8%)
α = −1.0
26.12.86 0.00086 0.01300 02.04.90 (72.0%) 22.03.90 (76.7%) 19.03.90 (80.3%) 11.11.87 (54.1%)
30.06.87 0.00191 0.01114 04.01.88 (54.5%) 10.11.87 (55.7%) 20.10.87 (56.3%) 20.10.87 (56.3%)
30.06.88 0.00163 0.00585 21.02.90 (91.8%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 21.02.90 (91.8%) 16.01.90 (94.7%)
28.12.88 0.00064 0.00634 19.03.90 (80.3%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%)
30.06.89 0.00039 0.00602 20.03.90 (79.2%) 13.03.90 (83.8%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%)
29.09.89 0.00045 0.00497 13.03.90 (83.8%) 26.02.90 (85.6%) 23.02.90 (89.7%) 21.02.90 (91.8%)
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5. The Japanese golf course membership market
5.1 Background
In 1989 there were more than 400 golf courses in Japan with a total value more than US$300
billion, a value larger than the Australian stock exchange capitalization of A$250 billion. Mem-
berships, which cost as much as US$8 million, allowed play at a reduced cost plus the right to
bring guests to play for a higher fee. However, their main value was not the ability to play golf
but their share of the land occupied by the course and as an instrument to play the land market
for relatively low stake with liquidity. These memberships were actively traded as speculative
investments whose market was maintained by six market makers in Tokyo and Osaka. Weekly
data was available in various areas of Japan since the beginning of 1982. This data was the best
widely available data series on land prices in Japan and forms an ideal source for many types of
analyses.
Rachev and Ziemba (1992) modeled the price changes as stable variants. The tails had consid-
erable mass and the distributions were considered to have fat tails with a characteristic exponent
about 1.4. This is consistent with the hypothesis that there was a speculative bubble in the late
1980s and the subsequent crash in 1990 to 1992.
Figure 6 shows the golf course membership GCM prices in various regions of the country: the
western and the eastern parts of Japan, the Tokyo area and the nationwide average. The golf
course memberships market was a much bigger bubble than the stock market.
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Figure 6. Graphs of the golf course membership prices in various areas of Japan and the Nikkei stock average,
1985-1995, with the 1985 values as 100%.
5.2 Application of the changepoint detection method
We applied the changepoint detection method to the golf prices for four diﬀerent entering dates
(July 1988, January 1989, July 1989, October 1989), four diﬀerent values of the ratio μ2/μ1
(−0.5, −1.0, −2.0, −5.0) and the three utility functions U0(x) = log x, U−1/2(x) = −x−1/2,
U−1(x) = −1/x. In all the cases, σ2 = σ1. We use weekly data, and the parameters μ1 and σ1
are estimated using the 20 previous index weekly values before the enter date. Same as in the
previous section we consider the time horizon T of the model corresponding to the end of 1989,
1990, and 1992.
The results are displayed in Tables 6 to 17 with the same notation as the previous section.
In all cases with T=1990, the model exits well above 90% of the global maximum price and all
exits produced proﬁts, see Figure 7. When T=1989, before the global peak in prices, the exits
are near the top but not as high, about 88% of the peak with all the exits producing trading
proﬁts; see Figure 8. When T=1992, the results are similar to T=1990 as shown in Figure 9. The
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exits are very close (96-98%) to the peak and all entries had trading gains. See the discussion
in section 6 about lags in prices with stocks leading golf course membership prices, leading all
land declines in 1990-1991.
Remark. Compared with the stock market bubble, the changepoint model applied to the golf
course membership index exits almost immediately after the peak. One reason for that is the
higher signal-to-noise ratio μ1/σ (see Tables 3–5 and 6–17): the statistic ψt increases “faster”
when the drift switches to the value μ2 from μ1, as observed from the formula for ψt. Also
we use weekly data for the golf market, so one period in changepoint detection delay in t-time
corresponds to a week in calendar time, while for the stock market daily data is used.
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Table 6.: Nationwide GCM prices, T = end of 1990
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00237 0.00280 25.03.90 (98.0%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.12.88 0.00296 0.00228 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.06.89 0.00595 0.00347 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
24.09.89 0.01300 0.00689 25.03.90 (98.0%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00237 0.00280 25.03.90 (98.0%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.12.88 0.00296 0.00228 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.06.89 0.00595 0.00347 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
24.09.89 0.01300 0.00689 25.03.90 (98.0%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00237 0.00280 25.03.90 (98.0%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.12.88 0.00296 0.00228 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.06.89 0.00595 0.00347 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
24.09.89 0.01300 0.00689 18.03.90 (98.9%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
Table 7.: East Japan GCM prices, T = end of 1990
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00165 0.00361 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.12.88 0.00182 0.00311 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.06.89 0.00446 0.00455 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
24.09.89 0.01191 0.00639 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 01.04.90 (93.7%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00165 0.00361 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.12.88 0.00182 0.00311 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.06.89 0.00446 0.00455 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
24.09.89 0.01191 0.00639 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 01.04.90 (93.7%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00165 0.00361 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.12.88 0.00182 0.00311 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.06.89 0.00446 0.00455 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
24.09.89 0.01191 0.00639 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 01.04.90 (93.7%)
Table 8.: West Japan GCM prices, T = end of 1990
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00342 0.00235 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.12.88 0.00497 0.00349 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.06.89 0.00849 0.00715 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
24.09.89 0.01474 0.01141 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 11.11.90 (69.6%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00342 0.00235 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.12.88 0.00497 0.00349 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.06.89 0.00849 0.00715 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
24.09.89 0.01474 0.01141 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 11.11.90 (69.6%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00342 0.00235 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.12.88 0.00497 0.00349 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.06.89 0.00849 0.00715 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
24.09.89 0.01474 0.01141 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 11.11.90 (69.6%)
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Table 9.: Tokyo GCM prices, T = end of 1990
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00173 0.00367 25.03.90 (96.5%) 18.03.90 (98.3%) 18.03.90 (98.3%) 09.04.89 (65.8%)
25.12.88 0.00278 0.00851 01.04.90 (94.1%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%)
25.06.89 0.00189 0.00577 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 18.03.90 (98.3%)
24.09.89 0.00759 0.00821 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 01.04.90 (94.1%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00173 0.00367 25.03.90 (96.5%) 18.03.90 (98.3%) 18.03.90 (98.3%) 09.04.89 (65.8%)
25.12.88 0.00278 0.00851 01.04.90 (94.1%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%)
25.06.89 0.00189 0.00577 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 18.03.90 (98.3%)
24.09.89 0.00759 0.00821 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 01.04.90 (94.1%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00173 0.00367 25.03.90 (96.5%) 18.03.90 (98.3%) 18.03.90 (98.3%) 09.04.89 (65.8%)
25.12.88 0.00278 0.00851 01.04.90 (94.1%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%)
25.06.89 0.00189 0.00577 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 18.03.90 (98.3%)
24.09.89 0.00759 0.00821 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 01.04.90 (94.1%)
Table 10.: Nationwide GCM prices, T = end of 1989
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00237 0.00280 17.12.89 (87.8%) 17.12.89 (87.8%) 03.12.89 (85.5%) 19.11.89 (83.0%)
25.12.88 0.00296 0.00228 17.12.89 (87.8%) 10.12.89 (86.5%) 03.12.89 (85.5%) 12.11.89 (82.2%)
25.06.89 0.00595 0.00347 17.12.89 (87.8%) 17.12.89 (87.8%) 10.12.89 (86.5%) 19.11.89 (83.0%)
24.09.89 0.01300 0.00689 17.12.89 (87.8%) 17.12.89 (87.8%) 03.12.89 (85.5%) 12.11.89 (82.2%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00237 0.00280 17.12.89 (87.8%) 10.12.89 (86.5%) 03.12.89 (85.5%) 12.11.89 (82.2%)
25.12.88 0.00296 0.00228 17.12.89 (87.8%) 10.12.89 (86.5%) 03.12.89 (85.5%) 12.11.89 (82.2%)
25.06.89 0.00595 0.00347 17.12.89 (87.8%) 10.12.89 (86.5%) 03.12.89 (85.5%) 12.11.89 (82.2%)
24.09.89 0.01300 0.00689 17.12.89 (87.8%) 10.12.89 (86.5%) 03.12.89 (85.5%) 12.11.89 (82.2%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00237 0.00280 17.12.89 (87.8%) 10.12.89 (86.5%) 03.12.89 (85.5%) 12.11.89 (82.2%)
25.12.88 0.00296 0.00228 17.12.89 (87.8%) 10.12.89 (86.5%) 03.12.89 (85.5%) 12.11.89 (82.2%)
25.06.89 0.00595 0.00347 17.12.89 (87.8%) 10.12.89 (86.5%) 03.12.89 (85.5%) 12.11.89 (82.2%)
24.09.89 0.01300 0.00689 17.12.89 (87.8%) 10.12.89 (86.5%) 03.12.89 (85.5%) 12.11.89 (82.2%)
Table 11.: East Japan GCM prices, T = end of 1989
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00165 0.00361 17.12.89 (88.0%) 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 19.11.89 (84.3%)
25.12.88 0.00182 0.00311 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 03.12.89 (85.6%) 12.11.89 (83.7%)
25.06.89 0.00446 0.00455 17.12.89 (88.0%) 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 19.11.89 (84.3%)
24.09.89 0.01191 0.00639 17.12.89 (88.0%) 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 19.11.89 (84.3%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00165 0.00361 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 03.12.89 (85.6%) 12.11.89 (83.7%)
25.12.88 0.00182 0.00311 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 03.12.89 (85.6%) 12.11.89 (83.7%)
25.06.89 0.00446 0.00455 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 03.12.89 (85.6%) 12.11.89 (83.7%)
24.09.89 0.01191 0.00639 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 03.12.89 (85.6%) 12.11.89 (83.7%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00165 0.00361 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 03.12.89 (85.6%) 12.11.89 (83.7%)
25.12.88 0.00182 0.00311 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 03.12.89 (85.6%) 12.11.89 (83.7%)
25.06.89 0.00446 0.00455 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 03.12.89 (85.6%) 12.11.89 (83.7%)
24.09.89 0.01191 0.00639 17.12.89 (88.0%) 10.12.89 (86.7%) 03.12.89 (85.6%) 12.11.89 (83.7%)
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Table 12.: West Japan GCM prices, T = end of 1989
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00342 0.00235 24.12.89 (88.8%) 17.12.89 (87.0%) 10.12.89 (85.7%) 19.11.89 (81.0%)
25.12.88 0.00497 0.00349 17.12.89 (87.0%) 10.12.89 (85.7%) 03.12.89 (85.0%) 12.11.89 (79.9%)
25.06.89 0.00849 0.00715 17.12.89 (87.0%) 17.12.89 (87.0%) 03.12.89 (85.0%) 19.11.89 (81.0%)
24.09.89 0.01474 0.01141 17.12.89 (87.0%) 10.12.89 (85.7%) 03.12.89 (85.0%) 12.11.89 (79.9%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00342 0.00235 17.12.89 (87.0%) 10.12.89 (85.7%) 03.12.89 (85.0%) 12.11.89 (79.9%)
25.12.88 0.00497 0.00349 17.12.89 (87.0%) 10.12.89 (85.7%) 03.12.89 (85.0%) 12.11.89 (79.9%)
25.06.89 0.00849 0.00715 17.12.89 (87.0%) 10.12.89 (85.7%) 03.12.89 (85.0%) 12.11.89 (79.9%)
24.09.89 0.01474 0.01141 17.12.89 (87.0%) 10.12.89 (85.7%) 03.12.89 (85.0%) 12.11.89 (79.9%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00342 0.00235 17.12.89 (87.0%) 10.12.89 (85.7%) 03.12.89 (85.0%) 12.11.89 (79.9%)
25.12.88 0.00497 0.00349 17.12.89 (87.0%) 10.12.89 (85.7%) 03.12.89 (85.0%) 12.11.89 (79.9%)
25.06.89 0.00849 0.00715 17.12.89 (87.0%) 10.12.89 (85.7%) 03.12.89 (85.0%) 12.11.89 (79.9%)
24.09.89 0.01474 0.01141 17.12.89 (87.0%) 10.12.89 (85.7%) 03.12.89 (85.0%) 12.11.89 (79.9%)
Table 13.: Tokyo GCM prices, T = end of 1989
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00173 0.00367 17.12.89 (91.3%) 17.12.89 (91.3%) 09.04.89 (65.8%) 09.04.89 (65.8%)
25.12.88 0.00278 0.00851 10.12.89 (89.0%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 03.12.89 (88.2%) 12.11.89 (83.9%)
25.06.89 0.00189 0.00577 17.12.89 (91.3%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 03.12.89 (88.2%) 12.11.89 (83.9%)
24.09.89 0.00759 0.00821 17.12.89 (91.3%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 12.11.89 (83.9%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00173 0.00367 17.12.89 (91.3%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 09.04.89 (65.8%) 09.04.89 (65.8%)
25.12.88 0.00278 0.00851 10.12.89 (89.0%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 03.12.89 (88.2%) 12.11.89 (83.9%)
25.06.89 0.00189 0.00577 17.12.89 (91.3%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 03.12.89 (88.2%) 12.11.89 (83.9%)
24.09.89 0.00759 0.00821 17.12.89 (91.3%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 03.12.89 (88.2%) 12.11.89 (83.9%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00173 0.00367 17.12.89 (91.3%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 09.04.89 (65.8%) 09.04.89 (65.8%)
25.12.88 0.00278 0.00851 10.12.89 (89.0%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 03.12.89 (88.2%) 12.11.89 (83.9%)
25.06.89 0.00189 0.00577 17.12.89 (91.3%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 03.12.89 (88.2%) 12.11.89 (83.9%)
24.09.89 0.00759 0.00821 17.12.89 (91.3%) 10.12.89 (89.0%) 03.12.89 (88.2%) 12.11.89 (83.9%)
Table 14.: Nationwide GCM prices, T = end of 1992
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00237 0.00280 25.03.90 (98.0%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.12.88 0.00296 0.00228 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.06.89 0.00595 0.00347 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
24.09.89 0.01300 0.00689 25.03.90 (98.0%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 01.04.90 (95.0%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00237 0.00280 25.03.90 (98.0%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.12.88 0.00296 0.00228 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.06.89 0.00595 0.00347 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
24.09.89 0.01300 0.00689 25.03.90 (98.0%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 01.04.90 (95.0%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00237 0.00280 25.03.90 (98.0%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.12.88 0.00296 0.00228 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%)
25.06.89 0.00595 0.00347 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 18.03.90 (98.9%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
24.09.89 0.01300 0.00689 25.03.90 (98.0%) 25.03.90 (98.0%) 01.04.90 (95.0%) 01.04.90 (95.0%)
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Table 15.: East Japan GCM prices, T = end of 1992
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00165 0.00361 01.04.90 (93.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.12.88 0.00182 0.00311 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.06.89 0.00446 0.00455 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 25.03.90 (96.7%)
24.09.89 0.01191 0.00639 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 01.04.90 (93.7%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00165 0.00361 01.04.90 (93.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.12.88 0.00182 0.00311 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.06.89 0.00446 0.00455 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 25.03.90 (96.7%)
24.09.89 0.01191 0.00639 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 01.04.90 (93.7%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00165 0.00361 01.04.90 (93.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.12.88 0.00182 0.00311 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%)
25.06.89 0.00446 0.00455 25.03.90 (96.7%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 25.03.90 (96.7%)
24.09.89 0.01191 0.00639 18.03.90 (98.2%) 18.03.90 (98.2%) 25.03.90 (96.7%) 01.04.90 (93.7%)
Table 16.: West Japan GCM prices, T = end of 1992
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00342 0.00235 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.12.88 0.00497 0.00349 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.06.89 0.00849 0.00715 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
24.09.89 0.01474 0.01141 08.04.90 (94.5%) 08.04.90 (94.5%) 08.04.90 (94.5%) 08.11.92 (38.9%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00342 0.00235 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.12.88 0.00497 0.00349 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.06.89 0.00849 0.00715 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
24.09.89 0.01474 0.01141 08.04.90 (94.5%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 08.04.90 (94.5%) 08.11.92 (38.9%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00342 0.00235 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 25.03.90 (99.1%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.12.88 0.00497 0.00349 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
25.06.89 0.00849 0.00715 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%)
24.09.89 0.01474 0.01141 01.04.90 (96.4%) 01.04.90 (96.4%) 08.04.90 (94.5%) 08.11.92 (38.9%)
Table 17.: Tokyo GCM prices, T = end of 1992
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
26.06.88 0.00173 0.00367 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 09.04.89 (65.8%)
25.12.88 0.00278 0.00851 15.04.90 (89.7%) 08.04.90 (92.2%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 01.04.90 (94.1%)
25.06.89 0.00189 0.00577 08.04.90 (92.2%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%)
24.09.89 0.00759 0.00821 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 01.04.90 (94.1%)
α = −0.5
26.06.88 0.00173 0.00367 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 09.04.89 (65.8%)
25.12.88 0.00278 0.00851 15.04.90 (89.7%) 08.04.90 (92.2%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 01.04.90 (94.1%)
25.06.89 0.00189 0.00577 08.04.90 (92.2%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%)
24.09.89 0.00759 0.00821 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 01.04.90 (94.1%)
α = −1.0
26.06.88 0.00173 0.00367 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 09.04.89 (65.8%)
25.12.88 0.00278 0.00851 15.04.90 (89.7%) 08.04.90 (92.2%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 01.04.90 (94.1%)
25.06.89 0.00189 0.00577 08.04.90 (92.2%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%)
24.09.89 0.00759 0.00821 01.04.90 (94.1%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 25.03.90 (96.5%) 01.04.90 (94.1%)
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Figure 7. The results for the GCM prices when T = end of 1990: the enter (blue circles) and exit (red squares)
dates for the values of the parameters α = 0.0, μ2 = −μ1.
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
1988 1989 1990
(a) Nationwide GCM
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
1988 1989 1990
(b) East Japan GCM
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
1988 1989 1990
(c) West Japan GCM
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
1988 1989 1990
(d) Tokyo GCM
Figure 8. The results for the GCM prices when T = end of 1989: the enter (blue circles) and exit (red squares)
dates for the values of the parameters α = 0.0, μ2 = −μ1.
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Figure 9. The results for the GCM prices when T = end of 1992: the enter (blue circles) and exit (red squares)
dates for the values of the parameters α = 0.0, μ2 = −μ1.
6. The overall Japanese land market, 1955 to 2013
Figures 10 and 11 and Table 18 give the Japan Real Estate Institute’s land indices for the six
largest cities, and for all of Japan for commercial, housing, industrial and total land for each
six month period from 1955 to 2013. The ﬁgures also gives the yearly rate of changes. The six
largest cities are Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Nagoya, Kobe and Kyoto.
The country wide indices are based on 140 cities. The data are appraisal based which tends to
smooth the price levels and lag the market. Simple averages of samples of ten lots in each city
form the indices which were normalized at 100 as of 1985. The sampling procedure separates
land into high, medium and low grades reﬂecting location, social circumstances, yield, etc. The
sampling procedure selects lots randomly and equally from each of these three classes.
Table 18 also indicates that the price increase has been largest in the six largest cities. Despite
large rises in the 1980s, the relative gain in the period 1955 to 1970 was much larger than from
1970 to the circa 1990 peak. For land in the whole country, the 1955 to 1970 period produced
gains of about 15 times the 1955 values. These prices then increased only about four fold in the
ensuing twenty years. In the six largest cities, the increase was also much larger in the 1955 to
1970 period versus the next two decades.
Land values in the six largest cities outpaced the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) by twenty
times from 1955 to 1990. In the Ginza district of Tokyo each square meter of land was worth
well over US$200,000 with some plots approaching $300,000. Choice downtown land in Tokyo
sold for the equivalent of nearly a billion dollars an acre. At neighboring land prices, the value
of land under the Emperor’s palace and garden in Tokyo equaled that of all California or of
Canada. The total land value in Japan in 1990 was about 4.1 times that of the whole United
States. Japanese land was worth some 2180 trillion as of the end of 1989. This compares with
a value of 1050 trillion at the end of 1985. Using an exchange rate of 143.76 per dollar at the
end of 1989, gave a land value of $15.16 trillion. As of September 1990, all land had an index of
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Figure 10. Land price indices for industrial, residential, commercial and all land and annual rates of price change
for six largest cities, 1955 to 2013. Source: Japan Real Estate Institute
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Figure 11. Land price indices for industrial, residential, commercial and all land and annual rates of price change
for all land, 1955 to 2013. Source: Japan Real Estate Institute
203.1, up 16.2% from September 1989.
With an end of 1990 exchange rate of 135.40, total Japanese land values were in the $18.7
trillion range in late 1990. The average acre of land in Japan was worth fully 100 times the
average acre in the U.S. So even though the US has about 25 times more land than Japan,
its 1990 total value was less than a fourth as much. Essentially half the world’s land value at
1987-90 prices was accounted for by Japanese land! It also accounted for about 20% of the
total non-human capital asset value in the world. Simple houses in Tokyo rented for more than
$10,000 per month and cost in the millions. Oﬃce space for sale in Tokyo’s ﬁnancial district cost
nearly $75,000 per square foot. Some luxury apartments in Tokyo rented for well over $20,000
per month.
Table 18. Increase of land prices, 1955 to 1990, %. Source: Japan Real Estate Institute
Nationwide 6 largest cities
Total Commercial Residential Industrial Total Commercial Residential Industrial
1955 to 1990 65.5 59.6 81.2 56.7 178.8 127.7 219.1 150.8
1955 to 1970 15.1 14.5 15.5 15.8 18.7 11.0 20.2 23.6
1970 to 1990 4.3 4.1 5.2 3.6 9.6 11.6 10.8 6.4
In 1988 Tokyo’s land value alone was about $7.7 trillion, or about half the land value of the
whole country. To understand how much this is we can do a idealized experiment. Let’s borrow
on it up to 80% of its value. Banks in Tokyo commonly provided such loans based on land
security until the high interest rates of late 1989 into 1990. From 1987 to 1989, the interest rates
on loans secured by land were 5.7% and 6.6% for variable and ﬁxed rate loans, respectively. We
would then have almost enough money to purchase all the land in the U.S. for $3.7 trillion and
all the stock on the New York, American and NASDAQ over-the-counter stock exchanges for
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about $2.6 trillion in an all-cash transaction. Obviously, one could not sell all of Tokyo’s land
for $7.7 trillion quickly, nor would a group of banks undertake such a large loan, but this was
the value of land prices in ﬁscal 1987. In Tokyo about 2% of land changed hands each year. The
price was kept up and bid higher because of the excess of demand over supply.
A staggering 56% of the national wealth of Japan was land. The 1990 percentage was even
higher since there was a huge price increase in 1986 and steady rises since then. Land turnover
was very small as the Japanese believe in holding land whenever possible. This was reinforced
by the tax system which encourages the purchase of more land and discourages land sales. The
population in per unit of habitable area was thirty times higher in Japan than the US. The GNP
and energy consumption per habitable area were also much higher in Japan than in the U.S.
(though the energy per unit GNP was much lower in Japan), see Table 19. This put upward
pressure on land prices.
Table 19. Comparison of Fundamentals, Japan and the U.S., 1989. Source: Daiwa Securities America, Inc
Japan as
Japan US % of US
Population, millions 120 239 50.21
Total area (1000 sq km) 377 9373 4.02
Habitable area (1000 sq km) 80 4786 1.67
Population per habitable area (pop/sq km) 1500 50 3,000.00
GNP per habitable area (million $/sq km) 16.90 0.80 2,122.50
Energy consumption (tone oil equivalent/sq km) 4650 390 1,192.38
Boone (1989) developed several models in an attempt to rationalize the high land values in
Japan from an economic point of view. He found that if Japan’s GNP growth exceeded that in
the U.S. by about 2% per year forever, then land prices 100 times higher in Japan than in the
U.S. are consistent with the economic model.
High interest rates which led to a sharp fall in stock prices in 1990 did not lead to any decline
in land prices until 1991 as shown in Figures 10 and 11. However, there was a sharp decline
in speculative land such as golf course membership and condos, see Stone and Ziemba (1993).
As interest rates rise, land demand fell but in Tokyo, with virtually no new supply, demand
still greatly exceeded supply. At the same time supply declines with higher interest rates as
development costs are curtailed. All the incentives favored holding land and not even developing
it. As Canaway (1990) pointed out, land held less than ﬁve years was taxed at fully 52% of its
sale value. Meanwhile, yearly taxes paid to hold land were about 0.05 to 0.10% of its current
value. Even upon death it paid to borrow money which was deductible at full value while land
was valued at about half its market value. Hence inheritance taxes are minimized. Canaway
argued that in a major crash the stock market will go ﬁrst, then the economy and ﬁnally the
land markets. Our results conﬁrm this.
7. Applying the model to the Nikkei in 2013
In 2013 a policy to devalue the usually strong yen led to a large increase in stock prices. Since
the -48% crash in 1990, the Nikkei has had its ups and downs but, as shown in Figure 4, it has
never really recovered to the 1990 peak.
We apply the changepoint detection model to the Nikkei225 with T corresponding to the end
of 2013. Table 20 shows the exits from the market past the 2013 local peak, and Figure 12
illustrates the results for the parameters α = 0, μ2 = −μ1, using data to October 2013. All the
entries have exits with proﬁts.
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Table 20.: Nikkei-225 from November 2012 to October 2013
Enter μ1 σ
|μ2/μ1|
0.5 1.0 2.0 5.0
α = 0.0
01.02.13 0.00512 0.01206 30.05.13 (87.0%) 30.05.13 (87.0%) 23.05.13 (92.7%) 23.05.13 (92.7%)
01.03.13 0.00383 0.01527 13.06.13 (79.6%) 03.06.13 (84.9%) 30.05.13 (87.0%) 23.05.13 (92.7%)
01.04.13 0.00269 0.01596 22.08.13 (85.5%) 13.06.13 (79.6%) 03.06.13 (84.9%) 30.05.13 (87.0%)
α = −0.5
01.02.13 0.00512 0.01206 30.05.13 (87.0%) 27.05.13 (90.5%) 23.05.13 (92.7%) 23.05.13 (92.7%)
01.03.13 0.00383 0.01527 13.06.13 (79.6%) 03.06.13 (84.9%) 30.05.13 (87.0%) 23.05.13 (92.7%)
01.04.13 0.00269 0.01596 20.08.13 (85.7%) 07.06.13 (82.4%) 03.06.13 (84.9%) 30.05.13 (87.0%)
α = −1.0
01.02.13 0.00512 0.01206 30.05.13 (87.0%) 27.05.13 (90.5%) 23.05.13 (92.7%) 23.05.13 (92.7%)
01.03.13 0.00383 0.01527 06.06.13 (82.6%) 03.06.13 (84.9%) 30.05.13 (87.0%) 23.05.13 (92.7%)
01.04.13 0.00269 0.01596 20.08.13 (85.7%) 06.06.13 (82.6%) 03.06.13 (84.9%) 30.05.13 (87.0%)
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Figure 12. Nikkei225 from November 2012 to October 2013.
8. Short selling the Nikkei portfolio
Would it be possible to apply the changepoint detection theory to proﬁt from the price decline
by short selling the index portfolio when the changepoint is detected?
Consider the method which consists in selling short the index portfolio when the crash of the
bubble is detected, and ﬁnding the stopping time τ to buy the portfolio back which minimizes
E log(Sτ )1. The latter problem is equivalent to maximizing E log(1/Sτ ) and reduces to Theorem
3.1 with S˜t = 1/St. We applied this method to the Nikkei index portfolio in 1990 and 2013 with
short selling on 16.01.90, 21.02.90, 23.02.90, and 30.05.13, 03.06.13, which are the dates when
the crashes are detected by the changepoint model with parameters α = 0 and μ2 = −μ1 (see
Tables 3 and 20). In the problem of minimizing E log(Sτ ), we set μ1 = −μˆ, σ = σˆ, where μˆ and σˆ
are the estimated parameters of the drift and volatility of the log-prices during the 100 trading
days before the market peaks on December 29, 1989 and March 22, 2013. The value of μ2 varies
through μ2 = −0.5μ1,−μ1,−2μ1,−3μ1,−5μ1, and T corresponds to the end of 1990 and 2013
respectively.
The exit dates obtained for both 1990 and 2013 do not depend on the entry dates. For 1990,
we get 11.05.90 for μ2 = −0.5μ1, 07.05.90 for μ2 = −μ1, 09.04.90 for μ2 = −2μ1 and 26.03.90 for
μ2 = −3μ1 and μ2 = −5μ1. The corresponding daily closing prices are 31512, 30956, 30398 and
31840, while the entry prices are 36850 (on 16.01.90), 35734 (21.02.90) and 34891 (23.02.90); the
local trough was on April 2, 1990 at 28002. Thus the strategy was proﬁtable in this case.
In 2013, for the both entry dates the exits are 05.07.13 for μ2 = −0.5μ1, 02.07.90 for μ2 = −μ1,
μ2 = −μ1,−2μ1,−3μ1, and 01.07.13 for μ2 = −5μ1. The corresponding daily closing prices,
14309.97, 14098.74, and 13852.50 are close to the local minimum at 12445.38 (June 13, 2013),
however the strategy was unproﬁtable.
1Other utility functions can be considered in a similar way.
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One can use these results to develop a multi-changepoint detection model, which buys (sells
short) assets when the signal-to-noise ratio is high and positive (respectively, negative with
large absolute value) and sells (buys) after it detects a changepoint, repeating this procedure
continuously in time. We leave the analysis of this strategy for future research. The substantial
diﬃculty here consist in the estimation of the risk of such a strategy, since our assumptions
(mainly, log-normal returns with constant parameters, and the loose method of choosing T ) do
not allow an accurate quantitative prediction of the strategy performance. A theoretical result
for a multiple changepoint model for a Brownian motion, which is a continuous-time analogue
of our model, was obtained by Gapeev (2010).
9. Conclusion
This paper studies the Nikkei stock average and golf course membership prices around 1990 in
Japan. Both of these asset markets were in bubble type markets and had huge rises up and then
dramatic falls. High interest rates relative to stock earnings seems to be the main cause of both
crashes. The bond stock earnings yield diﬀerence model predicted the stock market crash. In
time sequence, the stock market fell ﬁrst then the golf course membership market and ﬁnally
the land markets. We use a changepoint detection model designed to exit bubble type markets
and apply it successfully to the Nikkei stock average and the golf course membership markets
in various areas of Japan.
Data from 1990 to 2013 indicate that both the stock and land markets have never recovered
to their circa 1990 prices. The Nikkei had a big rise in 2013 fueled by a weak yen policy and
this market peaked in mid 2013 and the changepoint detection model suggested an exit then. In
virtually all entry cases the stopping rule model has good exits as they were close to the global
price peaks and produce proﬁts.
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